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Abstract
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Under the traditional “competition-fragility” view, 
more bank competition erodes market power, decreases 
profit margins, and results in reduced franchise value 
that encourages bank risk taking. Under the alternative 
“competition-stability” view, more market power in the 
loan market may result in greater bank risk as the higher 
interest rates charged to loan customers make it more 
difficult to repay loans and exacerbate moral hazard and 
adverse selection problems. But even if market power 
in the loan market results in riskier loan portfolios, the 
overall risks of banks need not increase if banks protect 
their franchise values by increasing their equity capital or 
engaging in other risk-mitigating techniques. The authors 
This paper—a product of the Finance and Private Sector Team, Development Research Group—is part of a larger effort 
in the department to study bank concentration and competition. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the 
Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The author may be contacted at lklapper@worldbank.org.  
test these theories by regressing measures of loan risk, 
bank risk, and bank equity capital on several measures 
of market power, as well as indicators of the business 
environment, using data for 8,235 banks in 23 developed 
nations. The results suggest that—consistent with the 
traditional “competition-fragility” view—banks with 
a greater degree of market power also have less overall 
risk exposure. The data also provide some support for 
one element of the “competition-stability” view—that 
market power increases loan portfolio risk. The authors 
show that this risk may be offset in part by higher equity 
capital ratios.  
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I. Introduction 
There is a current debate in the banking literature regarding the effect of competition on the 
stability of banks.  Under the traditional “competition-fragility” view, more bank competition 
erodes market power, decreases profit margins, and results in reduced franchise value – the 
ongoing concern or market value of the banks beyond their book values.  This encourages 
banking organizations to take on more risk to increase returns (e.g., Marcus 1984, Keeley 1990, 
Demsetz, Saidenberg, and Strahan 1996, Carletti and Hartmann 2003).  For example, Keeley 
(1990) finds that increased competition and deregulation following relaxation of state branching 
restrictions in the U.S. in the 1980s eroded monopoly rents and resulted in a surge of bank 
failures.  Similarly, Hellmann, Murdock, and Stiglitz (2000) argue that removal of interest 
ceilings on deposits erodes franchise value and encourages moral hazard behavior by banks.  
Some recent empirical research is consistent with this view, finding that more competition 
(measured using the Lerner index) is associated with a higher-risk loan portfolio measured using 
nonperforming loans in Spain (Jimenez, Lopez, and Saurina 2007).
1 
Recent literature has arisen that takes a contrary “competition-stability” view.  Boyd and 
De Nicolo (2005) contend that more market power in the loan market may result in higher bank 
risk as the higher interest rates charged to loan customers make it harder to repay loans and 
exacerbate moral hazard incentives of borrowers to shift into riskier projects.  The higher rates 
may also result in a riskier set of borrowers due to adverse selection considerations.  It is also 
possible that a highly concentrated banking market may lead to more risk taking if the 
institutions believe that they are too big to fail and are more likely to be explicitly or implicitly 
protected by the government safety net.  Some recent empirical work is consistent with this view.  
Boyd, De Nicolo, and Jalal (2006) and De Nicolo and Loukoianova (2006) both find that the Z-
index, an inverse measure of bank risk, decreases with banking market concentration (measured 
using the Herfindahl-Hirschman index or HHI), implying that the risk of bank failure rises in 
more concentrated markets.  In addition, Schaeck, Cihak, and Wolfe (2006) implement a logit 
                                                 
1 Note that franchise value deters bank risk taking to the extent that owners believe that their ownership of the bank 
is at risk in the event of insolvency.  If regulators are expected to forbear and leave ownership intact, the owners 
may not have significant incentives to control risks (Frame and White forthcoming).  
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model and duration analysis and find that more competitive banking systems (measured using 
the Panzar and Rosse H-statistic) have lower likelihoods of bank failure and a longer time to 
crisis, and hence are more stable than monopolistic systems. 
Note that the two strands of the literature need not necessarily yield opposing predictions 
regarding the effects of competition and market power on stability in banking.  Even if market 
power in the loan market results in riskier loan portfolios, the overall risks of the banks need not 
increase.  If banks enjoy higher franchise value derived from their market power, they may 
protect this value from the higher loan risk with other methods.  Specifically, they can offset the 
higher risk exposure through more equity capital, reduced interest rate risk, sales of loans or 
credit derivatives, a smaller loan portfolio, or other risk-mitigating techniques.  Thus, when a 
bank charges higher rates for business loans and has a riskier loan portfolio, the bank may still 
choose a lower overall risk.  This argument suggests that it is important in studies of the effects 
of market power on bank risk that dependent variables are chosen to reflect both loan risk and 
bank risk, thereby distinguishing whether one or both of the theories may be operative 
simultaneously.  While some previous research used the Z-index as an inverse proxy for overall 
bank risk, other papers focused on nonperforming loans, which only measure loan risk.  No prior 
study to our knowledge has estimated the effects of market power or measures of 
competitiveness on both loan risk and overall bank risk using the same model.  Few studies have 
also investigated the effect of competition on banks’ capital ratios.  Schaek and Cihak (2007) 
show that banks tend to hold higher capital ratios in more competitive environments in the 
context of European banking. 
An additional issue in the tests of these opposing theories is the measure of market 
power.  A number of studies use measures of concentration, such as the HHI or n-firm 
concentration ratio, to indicate market power, but these have been shown to be ambiguous 
indicators (e.g., Berger, Demirguc-Kunt, Levine, and Haubrich 2004).
2  For example, Beck, 
Demirguc-Kunt, and Levine (2006) find that both concentration and competitiveness in banking 
measured in other ways – such as entry and activity restrictions – improve financial stability, 
suggesting that concentration might not be an appropriate measure of the degree of 
                                                 
2 Alegria and Schaeck (2008) show that bank concentration measures are sensitive toward the number of banks in 
each country and that their choice affects the inferences regarding the degree of competition.  
  3 
competitiveness in banking.  Some studies employ the Panzar and Rosse H-statistic to assess the 
degree of competitiveness in banking (e.g., Claessens and Laeven 2004, Schaeck, Cihak, and 
Wolfe 2006, Molyneux and Nguyen-Linh 2008).  There are also some issues with this proxy for 
the degree of market power, particularly because it requires that banks be in long-run equilibrium 
(Shaffer 2004).  As indicated above, one study of the effect of concentration on bank loan risk 
uses the Lerner index (Jimenez, Lopez, and Saurina 2007).  No prior study to our knowledge 
assesses the prevailing market structure comparing the effects of using different measures of 
competition.  In this study, we include multiple measures of competition to check for robustness 
of the findings. 
An important feature of our approach is that we control for possible endogeneity of the 
measures of the degree of market power.  Endogeneity can arise when causality is reversed, i.e., 
when the degree of market power depends on loan risk, overall bank risk and capitalization 
levels.  If a well-capitalized bank decides to pursue a growth strategy and merges with another 
bank, it can then increase the bank’s degree of market power.  Similarly, if a bank increases its 
loan portfolio risk and its overall bank risk, then the higher expected return may provide an 
incentive for the firm to gain a higher degree of market power.  To address this potential 
endogeneity, we turn to instrumental variable techniques, using a GMM estimator.  Following 
Schaeck and Cihak (2007), we employ activity restrictions, banking freedom, and the percent of 
foreign- and government-owned banks as instruments to explain measures of the degree of 
market power. 
A further issue in testing the theories is the effect of the business environment for banks.  
For example, banks operating in nations with weak business environments may find it difficult to 
expand their loan portfolios to take on additional risks.  We include data on an index of legal 
rights, which measures the degree to which collateral and bankruptcy laws facilitate lending in 
our analysis.  We also control for foreign bank ownership in all regressions. 
This paper uses Bankscope data on 8,235 banks in 23 developed nations to test these 
alternative views.
3  We include three proxies for financial stability, including a measure of 
overall bank risk (the Z-index), a measure of loan risk (the ratio of nonperforming loans to total 
                                                 
3 The list of countries and the number of banks are included in the Appendix.  
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loans), and the capital ratio (equity to assets ratio) as indicator of effort to control overall bank 
risk.  We compute and consider separately several alternative measures of bank competition, 
including the Lerner index, which is based on the deviation between price and marginal costs.  
For several reasons, we prefer the Lerner index, but we also include in our analyses traditional 
measures of the degree of competition such as the HHI using deposits and loans to check for 
robustness.  Following recent research (Martinez-Miera and Repullo 2008), we allow for a 
nonlinear relationship between measures of risk and market structure in banking. 
By way of preview, the results suggest that – consistent with the “competition-stability” 
view – banks with a higher degree of market power bear significantly more loan portfolio risk.  
The findings also lend support to the “competition-fragility” view because we find that banks 
with more market power also enjoy less overall risk exposure.  The greater financial stability 
derives at least in part from holding significantly more equity capital.   
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows.  Section II provides a review of the 
literature on competition and stability in banking.  Section III outlines our econometric 
methodology.  Section III describes the data and variables used in these econometric tests.  We 
present the test results in Section IV and conclude in Section V. 
II. Literature  Review 
The banking industry serves as a major conduit through which instability may be transmitted to 
other sectors in the economy by disrupting the interbank lending market and payments 
mechanism, by reducing credit availability, and by freezing deposits.  The fear that increased 
competition may add to financial system fragility has traditionally motivated regulators to focus 
on developing policies that preserve stability in the banking sector.  
A large academic literature provides support to the “competition-fragility” nexus (see 
Carletti and Hartmann (2003) for a review of the literature).  Interest in the relationship between 
competition and stability in banking was triggered by the seminal article by Keeley (1990), who 
showed that increased competition in the 1980s eroded monopoly rents and led to an increase in 
bank failures in the U.S.  In a situation in which a large number of banks compete, profit margins 
are eroded and banks might take excessive risks to increase returns.  As more marginal loan 
applicants receive financing, the quality of the loan portfolio is likely to deteriorate and thereby  
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increase bank fragility.  Hellmann, Murdock, and Stiglitz (2000) show that competition for 
deposits can also undermine prudent bank behavior.  They list the U.S. Savings and Loans crisis 
and the Japanese crisis as examples of excessive risk taking that led to large social costs.  They 
put the blame on financial liberalization which removed barriers to entry and branching 
restrictions, in addition to deregulating interest rates.  Increased competition for deposits, in turn, 
lowers bank profitability and destroys franchise value, fueling moral hazard incentives.  When 
banks are highly competitive and franchise values are low, banks have a moral hazard incentive 
to take risks because of the government safety net.  That is, they have the option to “put” their 
assets to the deposit insurer or the government if they take risks and lose all their capital.  The 
authors argue that deposit rate controls thwart the market-stealing effect and provide incentives 
for banks to behave prudently.  They also argue that restrictions on competition for deposits are 
also more efficient than increasing capital requirements in curbing the “gambling for 
resurrection” behavior.  
As banks gain market power, their franchise value increases.  Because franchise value 
represents intangible capital that will only be captured if the bank remains in business, such 
banks face high opportunity costs of going bankrupt and they become more reluctant to engage 
in risky activities.  They tend to behave prudently by holding more equity capital, by holding less 
risky portfolios, and/or by originating a smaller loan portfolio. 
Alternatively, when banks gain market power, it is also possible that their risk exposure 
increases.  The “competition-stability” strand of the literature contends that financial instability 
increases as the degree of competitiveness is lessened.  Banks with market power will earn more 
rents by charging higher interest rates on business loans.  Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) show that 
higher interest rates may increase the riskiness of loan portfolios because of adverse selection 
(worse projects are funded) and moral hazard (risk shifting) problems.  While increased funding 
costs discourage safer borrowers, other borrowers are induced to choose riskier projects and are 
likely to face a higher probability of default.  The volume of nonperforming loans would then 
increase, adding to the bank’s risk exposure and undermine financial stability.
4 
                                                 
4 Conversely, as competition in the loan market rises, Koskela and Stenbacka (2000) construct a model to show that 
project-holders will increase their investments because of lower lending rates.  The authors argue that competition  
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Recent work by Boyd and De Nicolo (2005), Boyd, De Nicolo, and Jalal (2006), and 
Schaeck, Cihak, and Wolfe (2006) concurs that market power may destabilize the system and be 
detrimental for financial stability.  When making asset allocation decisions, banks are faced with 
both a portfolio decision and an optimal contracting problem.  The portfolio decision allocates 
financial claims among bonds and other traded securities in markets where banks are price 
takers, and where there is no private information.  Banks, however, have to solve an optimal 
contracting problem with their borrowers.  The latter possess private information and their 
actions depend on the terms of the loan contract.  Boyd and De Nicolo (2005) and Boyd, De 
Nicolo, and Jalal (2006) argue that existing research on financial stability assumes that 
competition is allowed in deposit markets, but is suppressed in loan markets.  They introduce 
models where competition is allowed in both deposit and loan markets and where banks have to 
solve for a non-trivial asset allocation problem.  The empirical findings of Boyd, De Nicolo, and 
Jalal (2006) indicate that the probability of failure increases with more concentration in banking, 
and they refute the trade-off between bank competition and stability.  However, their conclusions 
are drawn using concentration indicators, which might be insufficient measures of market 
structure.  In a survey of the literature on bank concentration and competition, Berger, 
Demirguc-Kunt, Levine, and Haubrich (2004) distinguish between concentration and broader 
measures of competition, and conclude that the competitiveness in banking cannot be gauged 
using classical concentration indicators.  Molyneux and Nguyen-Linh (2008) also investigate the 
relationship between competition and bank risk in South East Asian banking and find that 
competition does not increase bank risk-taking. 
Further, a closer look at the results of Boyd, De Nicolo, and Jalal (2006) casts doubt on 
their finding that the probability of bank failure increases in more concentrated markets.  
Although the correlation coefficient between concentration and financial stability and the 
regression parameter estimate of concentration in relation to financial stability are significantly 
negative, implying the prevalence of a trade-off, their values are almost zero (-0.06 and -0.0004 
respectively), pointing to a possible lack of an economically meaningful association between 
concentrated banking markets and financial stability.  Another work by Schaeck, Cihak, and 
Wolfe (2006) uses an alternative measure of the degree of competitiveness and concludes that 
                                                                                                                                                             
into the credit market will reduce bankruptcy risk of borrowers and conclude that there is no trade-off between 
lending market competition and financial fragility.  
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more competitive banking systems are more stable than monopolistic systems because of a lower 
likelihood of bank failure and a longer time to crisis.  However, their proxy of market structure, 
the Panzar and Rosse H-statistic, is derived from another study by Claessens and Laeven (2004) 
that was estimated using another data set. 
These findings are tested by Jiménez, Lopez, and Saurina  (2007) in the context of 
Spanish banks.  The authors construct a Lerner index based on bank-specific interest rates as a 
measure of the degree of market power in the commercial loan market and find a negative 
relationship between loan market power and portfolio risk.  They show that nonperforming loans 
decrease with a rise in the degree of power in the loan market, thus promoting financial stability.  
Their findings support the franchise value paradigm and do not provide evidence for the “risk-
shifting” paradigm identified by Boyd and De Nicolo (2005).  However, the Jimenez, Lopez and 
Saurina (2007) study only considers loan portfolio risk and does not examine the risk of the 
bank; as a result, it does not provide evidence on overall bank risk or financial fragility. 
Other recent empirical cross-country evidence on the relationship between bank 
concentration, bank competition, and banking system fragility is ambiguous.  For instance, Beck, 
Demirguc-Kunt, and Levine (2006) find that the likelihood of financial crises is lower in more 
concentrated banking systems, yet higher in less competitive systems (characterized by fewer 
entry and activity restrictions) and countries with less developed legal systems. 
III.  Outline of the Econometric Methodology 
We test the implication of market structure on the risk potential of banks using firm-level data 
from 23 industrialized countries.  We allow for a nonlinear relationship between financial 
stability and market structure in banking, following Martinez-Miera and Repullo (2008).  Our 
basic GMM regression model is based on a cross-section of banks, and has the general form: 
Financial Stabilityi = f(Market Structurei, Market Structurei
2, Business Environmentk) (1) 
Table 1 shows variable names and definitions of our dependent, explanatory and 
instrumental variables.  Subscripts i and k refer to bank and country, respectively.  
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We use different risk exposure indicators as dependent variables to proxy for financial 
stability: the volume of nonperforming loans (NPLs) to total loans to account for loan portfolio 
risk
5, the Z-index as an inverse measure of overall bank risk, and equity to total assets (E/TA) for 
the bank’s capitalization level.  Both NPLs and E/TA are averaged for each bank over the period 
under study. 
The Z-index is an inverse proxy for the firm’s probability of failure.  It combines 
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where ROAi is the period-average return on assets for bank i, E/TA represents the period-average 
equity to total assets ratio for bank i, and σROAi is the standard deviation of return on assets over 
the period under study.  The Z-index increases with higher profitability and capitalization levels, 
and decreases with unstable earnings reflected by a higher standard deviation of return on assets.  
It inversely proxies the bank’s probability of failure and is an indicator of financial stability at 
the firm level.  Thus, we use one observation per bank, despite having multiple years of data. 
We examine the impact of market structure in banking on risk-taking and financial 
stability using the Lerner index as a proxy for market power.  The Lerner index represents the 
mark-up of price over marginal costs and is an indicator of the degree of market power.  It is a 
“level” indicator of the proportion by which price exceeds marginal cost, and is calculated as: 
Lernerit = (PTAi t - MCTAit) / PTAit  (3) 
where PTAit is the price of total assets proxied by the ratio of total revenues (interest and 
noninterest income) to total assets for bank i at time t, and MCTAit is the marginal cost of total 
assets for bank i at time t.  The resulting Lernerit is averaged over the period under study for each 
bank i. MCTAit is derived from the following translog cost function: 
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where Qit represents a proxy for bank output or total assets for bank i at time t (e.g., Shaffer 
1993, Berg and Kim 1994, Fernandez de Guevara, Maudos, and Pérez 2005), and Wk,it are three 
input prices. W1,it, W2,it, 
Band W3,it indicate the input prices of labor, funds, and fixed capital, 
                                                 
5 We also include the volume of nonperforming loans to total equity for robustness.  
  9 
respectively, and are calculated as the ratios of personnel expenses to total assets, interest 
expenses to total deposits and other operating and administrative expenses to total assets, 
respectively.
6  Equation (3) is estimated separately for each country k in the sample to reflect 
potentially different technologies.  Year fixed effects are also introduced with robust standard 
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Finally, the Lerner index is averaged over time for each bank i for inclusion in the regression 
model.  As noted above, we also specify as alternative measures of market power more 
traditional measures of the degree of competition, the HHI using deposits and loans. 
Our measures of market power or market structure are calculated on a nationwide level.  
We acknowledge that banking markets do not always correspond with national borders.  Some 
banking products, such as wholesale credits and off-balance sheet liabilities to large corporations 
are competed for on an international basis.  Other products, such as retail deposits and small 
business loans, are more often competed for on a local basis, and the national level of banking 
market power may not coincide with the market power exercised at the local level.   
To address the likely endogeneity of measures of market power, we employ an 
instrumental variable technique with a Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimator.  A 
common problem in using empirical data is heteroskedasticity, and we test for its presence using 
several tests.
7 Although the Instrumental Variables coefficient estimates remain consistent in the 
presence of heteroskedasticity, the estimates of their standard errors are inconsistent, preventing 
valid inference and rendering the estimator inefficient.  The usual diagnostic tests for 
endogeneity and overidentifying restrictions will also be invalid if heteroskedasticity is present.
8 
Such estimation issues can partially be addressed by using heteroskedasticity consistent or robust 
standard errors, but the usual approach when facing heteroskedasticity of an unknown form is to 
use the GMM estimator, introduced by Hansen (1982).  The GMM does not require 
                                                 
6 A potential problem with the Lerner index, as we calculate it, is that we take as given the ratio of interest expenses 
to deposits, W2, which may itself embody market power in the deposit market. 
7 Among the tests for heterogeneity, we employ the Pagan-Hall, White/Koenker and Breusch-Pagan/Godfrey/Cook-
Weisberg tests, but we only report the results of the Breusch-Pagan/Godfrey/Cook-Weisberg tests. 
8 In order to test for endogeneity, we report the results of the First Stage F test; we also report the results of the 
Hansen's J test of overidentification.  
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distributional assumptions on the error terms; it is also more efficient than 2SLS because it 
accounts for heteroskedasticity (Hall 2005).  
We use activity restrictions, banking freedom, and the percent of foreign- and 
government-owned banks as instruments in the analysis.  Schaeck and Cihak (2007) employ the 
same instruments with a 2SLS technique; we account for the presence of heteroskedasticity by 
implementing a GMM estimation.  Activity restrictions are a key determinant for the scope of 
operations of banks and are likely to affect the level of competitiveness.  This index provides 
information as to whether banks can engage in securities, insurance, and real estate activities, 
and whether they can hold stakes in nonfinancial institutions.  Further, banking freedom 
represents a broad indicator for the openness of a banking system, capturing whether foreign 
banks are allowed to operate freely, whether difficulties are faced when setting up domestic 
banks, and whether the government influences the allocation of credit.  Other instrumental 
variables for the degree of competition include the percent of foreign- and government-owned 
banks.  These instruments directly impact competition, but cannot be assumed to directly affect 
loan risk, bank risk, or the capital level.  We test for the relevance of these instruments or the 
endogeneity of market power using the First Stage F test, and we use the Hansen's J test of 
overidentification to check their validity.  
IV.  Data and Variables Employed in the Tests 
We retrieve bank-level financial data for the years 1999-2005 from the BankScope database 
provided by Fitch-IBCA (International Bank Credit Analysis Ltd).  Our initial sample includes 
8,274 banks located in more than 30 developed countries.
9  We apply a number of filtering rules 
to eliminate non-representative data, reducing our analysis sample to 8,235 banks operating in 23 
different industrial countries.  Specifically, banks with missing loan-to-asset ratios and income 
statement data are excluded from the sample, in addition to banks where negative expenses are 
reported and banks with equity levels in the bottom and top 1% tail of the distribution.  Careful 
consideration is made to drop banks and not bank-year observations in order to sustain and 
benefit from the panel dimension of the data.  Further, income statement variables are winsorized 
at the top and bottom 1% of the distribution, as are other ratios like loans to assets and equity to 
assets.  Countries with fewer than five banks are also dropped from the original sample. 
                                                 
9 The developed nations correspond to the International Monetary Fund definition for "high-income" countries.  
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Table 2 shows descriptive statistics for the variables used in our main regressions.  All 
bank-level variables are averaged by bank over the period 1999-2005, and country-level 
variables are averaged by country over the period under study.  The dependent variables include 
the ratio of nonperforming loans to total loans, the bank Z-index, and equity to total assets.  The 
key exogenous variable is the measure of bank market structure proxied by the Lerner index, but 
we also include traditional measures of concentration such as the HHI deposit and loan indices to 
ensure robustness.  
We control for bank size and for foreign bank ownership.  We also collect country-level 
data on business regulations and their enforcement from the World Bank Doing Business 
database to proxy for the business environment in a particular country (World Bank 2006.)  Our 
control variable is an index of legal rights, which measures the degree to which collateral and 
bankruptcy laws facilitate lending.  We include the log value of GDP per capita in all regressions 
to control for variations in economic development.   
V. Empirical  Results 
A.  Main Regression Results 
Tables 3, 4, and 5 present our main regression results.  We estimate GMM regressions with 
robust standard errors clustered at the country level to correct for within-country correlation.  We 
test for the presence of heteroskedasticity in our data set and report the results of the Breush-
Pagan/Godfrey/Cook-Weisberg statistic.  We also run diagnostic tests for both the relevance 
(using the First Stage F-test) and the validity (using the Hansen’s J test) of the instruments of the 
degree of market power.  The results support the presence of heteroskedasticity –and hence the 
use of the GMM estimator— and show that our instruments are both relevant and valid. 
We use three dependent variables to proxy for financial stability:  In Table 3 we measure 
loan portfolio risk with the ratio of nonperforming loans, and in Tables 4 and 5 we measure 
overall bank risk and leverage risk with the Z-index and bank capitalization ratio, respectively.   
All regressions include either the Lerner index, HHI-deposit index, or HHI-loan index as 
a measure of industry competition, and which are instrumented with indicators of activity 
restrictions, banking freedom and the percent of foreign and government owned banks.  In all 
cases, higher values of the Lerner index, HHI-deposit index, and HHI-loan index imply higher  
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degrees of market power and hence a less competitive environment.  We also include bank size, 
foreign bank ownership, the Legal Rights index and the log value of GDP per capita in all 
regressions to control for variations in the business environment and economic development.  
Our objective is to study the impact of market structure on financial stability.  As discussed 
above, we include a quadratic term in the estimated equations to allow for a nonlinear 
relationship between measures of bank risk/loan risk and market structure in banking.  
Table 3 shows our results using nonperforming loans to total loans as our proxy for loan 
portfolio risk.  The coefficients of the linear terms are positive across all proxies of market 
power, while the coefficients of the quadratic terms are negative using HHI proxies of market 
structure.  In order to evaluate the type of relationship between the degree of market power and 
NPLs, the inflection point of each quadratic function is calculated and compared with the 
distribution of the data.  For example, in Model 1, the inflection point in Table 3 is -0.20, which 
is approximately the 4
th percentile of the Lerner index distribution, implying that more that 96 
percent of the data lies above the inflection point.  Given that the coefficient of the Lerner 
quadratic term is positive, the relationship between the degree of market power and loan 
portfolio risk is significantly positive.  Similarly, the results obtained for the HHI deposits show 
that the estimated function has a maximum (the sign of the quadratic term is negative) that 
occurs at the value of 0.25. With 99% of the data lying below the inflection point (the 99
th 
percentile of the HHI deposits data for developed countries occurs at 0.228), a significant and 
positive relationship is established between the HHI deposits and NPLs.  A comparable analysis 
of the results using the HHI loans also indicates a significant and positive association between 
market power and the ratio of nonperforming loans to total loans.  In line with the “competition-
stability” view of Boyd and De Nicolo (2005), the findings indicate that more market power is 
associated with riskier loan portfolios.  The results are consistent across the three different 
proxies of market power. 
Our main argument is that, even if market power in banking results in riskier loan 
portfolios, the bank’s overall risk needs not increase.  Table 4 examines the impact of the degree 
of competitiveness on the overall bank risk, using the Z-index as an inverse proxy of such overall 
risk.  A higher value for the Z-index may come from either higher earnings or more capital and  
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indicates more financial stability, while greater variability in earnings reduces the Z-index and 
thereby increases the bank’s overall risk.   
The results of Models 1, 2 and 3 show that the estimated quadratic functions have a 
downward oriented parabola shape with a positive linear term.  The inflection points (0.37, 0.15 
and 0.21 respectively for the Lerner index, the HHI deposits and the HHI loans respectively) all 
occur above the 99
th percentile of the Lerner index data, implying a positive relationship between 
all proxies of market power and the Z-index.  This suggests that more market power is associated 
with significantly higher overall bank stability.  The results lend support to the “competition-
fragility” view that an increase in competition in banking is likely to erode the franchise value of 
firms and encourage banks to increase their overall risk exposure.  We do not interpret this result 
as a contradiction to the previous finding that more market power leads to a riskier loan 
portfolio.  When banks enjoy higher franchise value derived from their market power, they are 
likely to command higher loan rates, thereby increasing the riskiness of their loan portfolio.  
However, the fact that banks with more market power also enjoy greater overall financial 
stability seems to suggest that they protect their franchise value from the higher loan risk with 
other risk management methods. 
In Table 5, we seek to establish whether banks enjoying a higher degree of market power 
do in fact hold more equity capital as a cushion to absorb unexpected losses resulting from their 
loan portfolio risk.  The results of Model 1 indicate that the inflection point occurs around the 
50
th percentile of the data and no significant positive or negative relationship can be established 
between the Lerner Index and the equity-to-assets ratio.  In contrast, the inflection point for 
Model 2 is evaluated at -0.03 and lies below the 1
st percentile of the HHI deposits data (because 
the quadratic function is upward oriented), so that a significant and positive relationship emerges 
between the degree of market power and bank capitalization levels. The positive sign in Model 3 
indicates that this result is maintained using the HHI loans as well.  Thus, the findings indicate 
that bank capitalization levels are higher for banks with more market power using the HHI 
deposits and loans proxies of market structure, while the results of the Lerner index seem to 
imply that half of banks with more market power do hold more equity capital.  
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In sum, more market power in industrial countries leads to riskier loan portfolios, but 
overall bank risk is reduced at least in part because banking institutions are likely to hold 
significantly more equity capital.  This result implies that banks enjoying more market power 
seem to be exposed to less overall bank risk, most likely as a result of their higher franchise 
value.
10 
Finally, we briefly consider our control variables.  First, we find that larger banks carry 
significantly less NPLs and therefore have a better loan portfolio quality (maybe due to better 
monitoring technologies) than smaller banks; they also enjoy greater overall stability 
notwithstanding their lower capitalization levels.  This finding may seem anomalous, but the 
equity to assets ratio used in the analysis does not consider the riskiness of bank assets and it 
could also be the case that the greater stability of large banks results from the use of better 
hedging techniques to immunize portfolios without necessarily increasing the bank’s capital 
base.   
Second, foreign ownership is associated with greater bank fragility as measured by a 
lower Z-index.  This evidence might be explained by the nature of foreign banks.  Foreign banks 
might only provide limited products or primarily serve firms from their home country, which 
might lead to more volatile earnings.  In addition, international tax differences might encourage 
profit shifting from local subsidiaries or branches (Huizinga and Laeven, 2007).  However, 
foreign ownership is also associated with greater bank capitalization, which may be due to 
differences in capital requirements for foreign-owned banks. 
Third, we also find some evidence that stronger legal rights is related to lower 
capitalization levels.  It might be the case that in generally strong business environments with 
strong investor protection, banks are less compelled to hold higher capitalization levels.  We also 
find that economic development, measured by GDP per capita, is associated with less bank 
fragility and higher levels of bank capitalization.   
                                                 
10 One reason why equity capital and stability are positively related is that capital is built up through inertia as 
retained earnings.  That is, higher ROA generates more equity capital as dividend payouts are relatively fixed (e.g.,  
Berger 1995, Berger, DeYoung, Flannery, Lee, and Oztekin 2008).   
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B. Robustness  Checks   
We run a number of robustness checks on our main models (not shown in tables).  First, we run 
our regressions using different control variables from the World Bank’s Doing Business report 
(World Bank 2006) including cost to register property, credit information, public registry, private 
bureau, cost to enforce contracts and informal economy.  Our main results are maintained.  
Second, our results are robust to excluding GDP per capita. Third, we exclude the quadratic 
(squared) term in our regressions to force a linear relationship between the degree of market 
power and the various measures of bank risk exposures.  The robustness checks are generally 
robust with the findings of the previous sections.  Banks with more market power carry riskier 
loan portfolios, but increased market power is also generally accompanied by greater levels of 
financial stability in terms of reduced overall risk.  The robustness tests also confirm the finding 
that banks with more market power hold significantly more equity capital.   
VI. Conclusions 
Under the traditional “competition-fragility” view, more bank competition erodes market power, 
decreases profit margins, and results in reduced franchise value.  This encourages banking 
organizations to take on more risk to increase returns.  Under the alternative “competition-
stability” view, more market power in the loan market may result in higher bank risk as the 
higher interest rates charged to loan customers make it harder to repay loans, and exacerbate 
moral hazard and adverse selection problems.  Both theories have received some degree of 
empirical support using different measures of bank or loan risk and the degree of competition or 
market power. 
We argue that the two strands of the literature need not necessarily yield opposing 
predictions regarding the effects of competition and market power on stability in banking.  Even 
if market power in the loan market results in riskier loan portfolios, the overall risks of the banks 
need not increase.  If banks enjoy higher franchise value derived from their market power, they 
may protect this value from the higher loan risk through more equity capital, a smaller loan 
portfolio, or other risk-mitigating techniques.  Thus, when banks charge higher rates for business 
loans and have a riskier loan portfolio, they may still choose a lower overall risk level.    
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We test the theories by regressing measures of loan risk, bank stability, and bank equity 
capital on several measures of market power, using bank-level data for 23 industrial nations.  We 
take account of the endogeneity of market power by employing activity restrictions, banking 
freedom, and the percent of foreign- and government-owned banks as instruments.  Our results 
suggest that, consistent with the traditional “competition-fragility” view, banks with a higher 
degree of market power also have less overall risk exposure.  However, the data also provide 
some support for one element of the “competition-stability” view – that market power does 
increase loan risk in these nations.  This risk may be offset in part by higher equity capital ratios.   
  
  17    
References 
Alegria, C. and K. Schaeck, 2008, On Measuring Concentration in Banking Systems, Finance 
Research Letters 5, 59-67. 
Barth, J., G. Caprio and R, Levine, 2007, Bank Regulation and Supervision (updated dataset), 
WB working paper series no. 2588. 
Beck, T., A. Demirguc-Kunt and R. Levine, 2006. Bank concentration, competition, and crises: 
first results, Journal of Banking and Finance 30, 1581-1603. 
Berger, A.N., 1995, The Relationship Between Capital and Earnings in Banking, Journal of 
Money, Credit and Banking, 27, 432-56. 
Berger, A.N., A. Demirguc-Kunt, R. Levine and J. Haubrich, 2004, Bank concentration and 
competition: An evolution in the making, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 36, 433-451. 
Berger, A.N., R. DeYoung, M.J. Flannery, D. Lee, and O. Oztekin, 2008, How do large banking 
organizations manage their capital ratios?, Federal Reserve working paper. 
Boyd, J. and G. De Nicolo, 2005, The Theory of Bank Risk Taking Revisited, Journal of 
Finance 60, 1329-1343. 
Boyd, J., G. De Nicolo, and A.M. Jalal, 2006, Bank risk taking and competition revisited: New 
Theory and Evidence, IMF Working paper, WP/06/297.  
Carletti, E. and P. Hartmann, 2003, Competition and Financial Stability: What’s Special about 
Banking?, In Monetary History, Exchange Rates and Financial Markets: Essays in Honour of 
Charles Goodhart, Vol. 2, edited by P. Mizen, Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar. 
Claessens, S. and L. Laeven, 2004, What Drives Bank Competition? Some International 
Evidence, Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking 36, 563-583.  
Djankov, S., R. La Porta, F. Lopez-de-Silanes and A. Shleifer, 2003, Courts, Quarterly Journal 
of Economics, 453-517. 
Djankov, S., McLiesh, C. A. Shleifer, 2007, Private Credit in 129 Countries, Journal of 
Financial Economics 84, 299-329. 
Demsetz, R., M.R. Saidenberg, and P.E. Strahan. 1996. Banks with something to lose: The 
disciplinary role of franchise value. Federal Reserve Bank of New York Economic Policy 
Review. v.2, no.2. (October): 1-14. 
De Nicolo, Gianni and Elena Loukoianova, 2006, Bank Ownership, Market Structure, and Risk, 
Unpublished Working Paper, International Monetary Fund, Washington, D.C.  
Frame, W.S., and L.J. White, forthcoming, Charter value, risk-taking incentives, and emerging 
competition for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking.  
  18    
Hall, A. R. 2005. Generalized Method of Moments. Oxford University Press. 
Hansen, L. (1982). Large sample properties of generalized method of moments estimators.   
Econometrica, 50, 1029–1054. 
Hellmann, T.F., K. Murdock and J. Stiglitz, 2000, Liberalization, moral hazard in banking and 
prudential regulation: are capital requirements enough?, American Economic Review, 90, 147-
165. 
Huizinga, H. and L. Laeven, 2008. International Profit Shifting within European Multinationals: 
A Multi-Country Perspective.  Journal of Public Economics 92( 5-6), 1164-1182. 
Jimenez, G., J. Lopez and J. Saurina, (2007), How does competition impact bank risk taking?, 
working paper, Banco de Espana.  
Koskela, E. and R. Stenbacka, 2000, Is there a tradeoff between bank competition and financial 
fragility?, Journal of Banking & Finance 24(12), 1853-1873. 
Keeley, M., 1990, Deposit Insurance, Risk and Market Power in Banking, American Economic 
Review, December, 1183-1200. 
Marcus, A.J., 1984, Deregulation and bank financial policy, Journal of Banking and Finance 8, 
557-565. 
Martinez-Miera, D. and R. Repullo, 2008, Does competition reduce the risk of bank failure?  
Unpublished manuscript, CEMFI. 
Molyneux, P. and H. Nguyen-Linh, 2008, Competition and risk in the South East Asian banking, 
Bangor Business School working paper, Bangor, Wales. 
Schaeck, K, M. Cihak, and S. Wolfe, 2006, Are More Competitive Banking Systems More 
Stable?, Unpublished Working Paper No. 143, International Monetary Fund, Washington, D.C. 
Schaeck, K., and M. Cihak, 2007, Banking Competition and Capital Ratios. IMF Working Paper 
No. 07/216. 
Shaffer, S., 2004, Comments on What Drives Bank Competition: Some International Evidence, 
by Stijn Claessens and Luc Laeven, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 36,  585-92. 
World Bank, 2006.  Doing Business.  The World Bank: Washington, D.C.    
  19    
 




NPLs  The bank-level ratio of nonperforming loans to total loans; a higher value 
indicates a riskier loan portfolio.  Values are averaged over time.  Source: 
BankScope, 2007. 
Z-index  The bank-level Z-index; a larger value indicates a higher bank stability and less 
overall bank risk.  Source: BankScope, 2007. 
E/TA  The bank-level capitalization ratio, measured as the ratio of equity to total assets; 
a higher ratio indicates lower bank risk.  Values are averaged over time.  Source: 
BankScope, 2007. 
Explanatory Variables: 
Lerner Index  A country-level indicator of bank competition, measured by the Lerner index, 
which is calculated as the average bank-level measure of the mark-up of price 
over marginal costs, with higher values indicating less competition in the banking 
sector.  Source: BankScope, 2007. 
HHI deposits  A country-level indicator of bank concentration, measured by the Herfindahl-
Hirschman Deposits Index, with higher values indicating greater market 
concentration.  Source: BankScope, 2007. 
HHI loans  A country-level indicator of bank concentration, measured by the Herfindahl-
Hirschman Loans Index, with higher values indicating greater market 
concentration.  Source: BankScope, 2007. 
Bank Size  The log value of Total Assets. Source: BankScope, 2007 
Foreign Ownership  A dummy variable set to 1 when total foreign shareholding exceeds 50% of total 
bank ownership. Source: BankScope, 2007. 
Ln (GDPPC)  The log value of GDP per capita.  Source: WB-WDI, 2007. 
Legal rights index  An index measuring the degree to which collateral and bankruptcy laws facilitate 
lending. The index ranges from 0 to 10 with higher scores indicating that 
collateral and bankruptcy laws are better designed to expand access to credit.  




An index and takes on values between (1) and (4), with higher values indicating 
greater restrictions on bank activities and nonfinancial ownership and control. 
Activities are classified as unrestricted (1), permitted (2), restricted (3), or 
prohibited (4), with possible index variation between four and sixteen. Source: 
Barth, Caprio and Levine (2007). 
Banking Freedom  An index ranging from (1) to (5), with higher values indicating fewer restrictions. 
The index informs whether foreign banks are allowed to operate freely, the 
difficulties when setting up domestic banks, and on government influence over 
the allocation of credit. Source: Heritage Foundation. 
Percent of foreign 
banks 
Percent of foreign-owned banks. Source: Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2007). 
Percent of 
government banks 
Percent of government-owned banks. Source: Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2007).  
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Banks Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min  Max 
NPLs to total loans  7767  0.01  0.01  0.00  0.18 
Z-Index 8235  56.76  48.86  6.07  280.90 
Equity to Assets  8235  0.12  0.07  0.04  0.64 
Lerner Index  8156  0.22  0.16  -0.55  0.59 
HHI deposits  8235  0.05  0.04  0.04  0.80 
HHI Loans  8235  0.04  0.05  0.03  0.77 
Legal Rights  8143  6.93  0.61  3.00  10.00 
Log of Total Assets  8235  11.76  1.42  7.49  20.33 
Log of GDP per capita  8235  10.44  0.11  9.44  10.77 
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Table 3.  The Effect of Market Power on NPLs 
 
This table shows bank-level GMM regressions with robust standard errors clustered at the country level to correct for 
within-country serial correlation.  The dependent variable is the ratio of nonperforming loans to total loans, to proxy a 
bank’s loan portfolio risk.  Explanatory variables are defined in Table 1.  Indicators of market power, Lerner Index, HHI 
(Deposits) and HHI (Loans) are instrumented using activity restrictions, banking freedom, and percent of banks that are 
both government and foreign owned. The First Stage F statistic tests the relevance of the instrumental variables, where 
rejecting the null hypothesis implies that the variables are not exogenous. The Hansen's J statistic tests the validity of the 
instruments used, and rejection implies that the instruments are not valid. The χ2 test of heteroskedasticity includes the 
Breusch-Pagan/Godfrey/Cook-Weisberg test. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels 




  Dependent Variable: Market Structure 
   Model (1)  Model (2)  Model (3) 
  Lerner Index  HHI Deposits  HHI Loans 
21.882 175.55 303.842  Degree of Market Power 
(21.300) (54.303)***  (114.274)*** 
55.389 -344.334 -716.327  Degree of Market Power Squared 
(26.223)** (176.544)* (266.620)*** 
Inflection point  -0.20 0.25  0.21 
Sign of the relationship  +  +  + 
-1.438 -0.404  -0.434  Ln(Total Assets) 
(0.394)*** (0.095)***  (0.126)*** 
1.514 -1.175  0.835  Foreign Ownership 
(0.535)*** (1.124)  (0.717) 
-14.601 -3.123  3.633  Legal Rights 
(3.421)*** (9.727)  (14.286) 
151.135 40.105  -46.571  Ln(GDPpc) 
(33.757)*** (96.466)  (149.798) 
-1.438 -0.404  -0.434  Constant 
(0.394)*** (0.095)***  (0.126)*** 
Number of Banks  7568 7641  7641 
First Stage F-test  42.404  26.228  45.853 
Prob > F  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Hansen's J χ
2 3.599  4.271  3.753 
P-value 0.165  0.118  0.15 
χ2 test of heteroskedasticity  1500  1600  1300 
P-value 0.000  0.000  0.000  
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Table 4: The Effect of Market Power on the Z-index 
 
This table shows bank-level GMM regressions with robust standard errors clustered at the country 
level to correct for within-country serial correlation.  The dependent variable is the Z-index, which 
is used as an inverse indicator of a bank’s fragility; a higher value indicates greater bank stability.  
Explanatory variables are defined in Table 1. Indicators of market power, Lerner Index, HHI 
(Deposits) and HHI (Loans) are instrumented using activity restrictions, banking freedom, and 
percent of banks that are both government and foreign owned. The First Stage F statistic tests the 
relevance of the instrumental variables, where rejecting the null hypothesis implies that the 
variables are not exogenous. The Hansen's J statistic tests the validity of the instruments used, and 
rejection implies that the instruments are not valid. The χ2 test of heteroskedasticity includes the 
Breusch-Pagan/Godfrey/Cook-Weisberg test. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 




  Dependent Variable: Market Structure 
   Model (1)  Model (2)  Model (3) 
  Lerner Index  HHI Deposits  HHI Loans 
7.863 10.649 8.718  Degree of Market Power 
(3.293)** (3.180)***  (2.409)*** 
-10.63 -34.407  -21.067  Degree of Market Power Squared 
(4.324)** (13.661)**  (5.834)*** 
Inflection point  0.37 0.15 0.21 
Sign of the relationship  +  +  + 
-0.038 0.09 0.093  Bank Size 
(0.068) (0.003)***  (0.004)*** 
-0.012 -0.022 -0.017  Foreign Ownership 
(0.021) (0.039) (0.019) 
0.605 1.408 1.608  Legal Rights 
(0.286)** (0.363)***  (0.342)*** 
-3.024 -12.238  -14.289  Ln(GDPpc) 
(2.875) (3.660)***  (3.633)*** 
-0.038 0.09 0.093  Constant 
(0.068) (0.003)***  (0.004)*** 
Number of Banks  8030  8109  8109 
First Stage F-test  21.798   24.065  41.242 
Prob > F  0.000  0.0000  0.0000 
Hansen's J  χ
2 1.463  1.702  4.378 
P-value 0.481  0.427  0.112 
χ2 test of heteroskedasticity  199.00  171.64  137.31 
P-value 0.000  0.000  0.000  
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Table 5: The Effect Market Power on Bank Capitalization 
 
This table shows bank-level GMM regressions with robust standard errors clustered at the country level to correct 
for within-country serial correlation.  The dependent variable is bank capitalization (the ratio of equity to total 
assets). Explanatory variables are defined in Table 1.  Indicators of market power, Lerner Index, HHI (Deposits) and 
HHI (Loans) are instrumented using activity restrictions, banking freedom, and percent of banks that are both 
government and foreign owned. The First Stage F statistic tests the relevance of the instrumental variables, where 
rejecting the null hypothesis implies that the variables are not exogenous. The Hansen's J statistic tests the validity 
of the instruments used, and rejection implies that the instruments are not valid. The χ2 test of heteroskedasticity 
includes the Breusch-Pagan/Godfrey/Cook-Weisberg test. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 




  Dependent Variable: Market Structure 
   Model (1)  Model (2)  Model (3) 
  Lerner Index  HHI Deposits  HHI Loans 
-0.691 0.184  1.022  Degree of Market Power 
(0.858) (0.201)  (0.169)*** 
1.587 2.891 -1.365  Degree of Market Power Squared 
(1.320) (0.999)***  (0.493)*** 
Inflection point  0.22 -0.03 0.37 
Sign of the relationship  +/-  +  + 
-0.004 -0.018 -0.018  Bank Size 
(0.013) (0.002)***  (0.002)*** 
0.032 0.049 0.043  Foreign Ownership 
(0.023) (0.017)***  (0.020)** 
0.008 -0.028 -0.006  Legal Rights 
(0.005) (0.006)***  (0.003)** 
0.062 0.182 0.109  Ln(GDPpc) 
(0.036)* (0.027)***  (0.018)*** 
-0.499 -1.408 -0.809  Constant 
(0.438) (0.240)***  (0.182)*** 
Number of Banks  8030  8109  8109 
First Stage F-test  18.12  23.94  45.39 
Prob > F  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Hansen's J χ
2 2.215  5.531  1.030 
P-value 0.330  0.063  0.597 
χ2 test of heteroskedasticity  576.97  137.31  1126.3 
P-value 0.000  0.000  0.000  
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Appendix 
 
List of Countries and Number of Banks  
 





















United Arab Emirates  17 
United Kingdom  43 
USA 7565 
 